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Mergers involving dominant firms legitimately receive close 
scrutiny under the antitrust laws, even if they involve tiny firms.  
Further, they should be examined closely even in markets that 
generally exhibit low entry barriers.  Many of the so-called 
“unilateral effects” cases in current merger law are in fact mergers 
that create dominant firms.  The rhetoric of unilateral effects often 
serves to disguise this fact by presenting the situation as if it 
involves the ability of a small number of firms (typically two or 
three) in a much larger market to increase their price to unacceptable 
levels.  In fact, if such a grouping of firms can achieve an 
unacceptably high price increase for an unacceptable length of time, 
that grouping is best viewed as a relevant market unto itself. 
 
 




No merger threatens to injure competition more than one that 
immediately changes a market from competitive to monopolized. To 
be sure, a market that was perfectly competitive before a merger and 
absolutely monopolized afterward would be a rare thing. If the 
merger involved only two firms who shared the entire market, that 
would entail that before the merger occurred, the two were 
duopolists, and duopoly markets typically perform quite poorly.1 
Nevertheless, the concern with such a merger would be warranted. 
Even in a duopoly market competition is possible and may 
                                                 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 
1 Indeed, depending on assumptions, output may be no higher, and 
price no lower, in such a market than it is in an absolute monopoly.  For 
example, if duopolists are behaving as a cartel they would charge the same 
price and collectively have the same output as a single-firm monopolist. 
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sometimes be quite robust. Further, new entry into the duopolist's 
market creates a third firm, while entry into a monopolist's market 
creates only a second. And the dominant firm permitted to acquire its 
only rival may do so again and again, thus indefinitely preserving its 
dominant or monopoly status. 
Easy entry; presumptive threshold 
Even relatively easy entry should not ordinarily be a defense to a 
merger creating a monopolist or a dominant firm.2 In such a market 
the existence and growth of a rival is simply too important for 
competition. The nascent entrant into such a market ordinarily earns 
only competitive returns, while the dominant firm's returns are far 
larger. As a result, merging with the dominant firm can often be more 
profitable to the new entrant than continuing the competitive struggle. 
Or, to state it another way, for the two firms' owners to share in 
possible monopoly profits is more profitable than for each to face 
competition. Of course, if entry is truly easy, the dominant firm will 
either have to make an ongoing series of acquisitions or its status as 
the dominant firm will begin to erode. 
Thus, when a merger creates a monopolist or dominant firm we 
would always place on the defendant the burden of showing that 
entry is so easy that monopoly profits could not be sustained for any 
significant length of time. We would assess this requirement any time 
the market share of the post-merger firm exceeds 50 percent.3 
                                                 
2 This is particularly the case when markets are defined, as they are in 
the 1992 Merger Guidelines, to include as “in the market” all firms that are 
likely to be producing within one year. See 2B Herbert Hovenkamp & Phillip 
E. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶561d (3d ed. 2008). 
 
3 Such a merger would always exceed the most severe concentration 
thresholds stated in the Merger Guideliens, with the possibility of an 
acquisition of a tiny firm—for example, if a 49.99 percent firm acquired a 
.02 percent firm, the merger would not increase the HHI by the requisite 50 
points. In general, however, any merger creating a firm of 42.5 percent or 
more necessarily produces market concentration exceeding 1800 HHI; and 
any merger creating a firm of 50 percent or more necessarily produces 
market concentration exceeding 2500 HHI. 
 
See United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990), which 
refused to condemn an exhibitor's acquisition of competing exhibitors when 
the immediate market share created was nearly 100 percent but the 
acquisition was followed almost immediately by entry and dramatic 
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Dominant Firm's Acquisition of Nascent Rival 
The acquisition by an already dominant firm of a new or nascent 
rival can be just as anticompetitive as a merger to monopoly. If the 
rival has already made its first sale in the monopolist's market the 
merger is clearly “ horizontal.” If the rival has not yet made its first 
sale, the tendency is to call the acquisition a “ potential competition” 
or nonhorizontal merger.4 But the distinction between “ actual” and 
“potential” competition is readily exaggerated. For example, a firm 
that has submitted bids against the dominant firm but lost is clearly 
an “actual” competitor, perhaps even forcing the dominant firm to 
lower its bid in the face of a rival bidder.5 But even the firm that is 
preparing to make its first bid or its first sale must be counted as an 
“actual” rival once the entry decision has been made. 
Acquisition of such a rival preserves the dominant firm's status, at 
least until another nascent rival appears on the scene. In most such 
cases we do not believe it is worthwhile to ascertain the number of 
rivals or the likelihood or time period in which another nascent rival 
will appear. The important point is that the acquisition eliminates an 
important route by which competition could have increased in the 
immediate future. It thus bears a very strong presumption of illegality 
that should rarely be defeated. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act condemns mergers that may 
substantially lessen competition. By contrast, §2 of the Sherman Act 
reaches acts that merely “maintain” a monopoly.6 While the 
distinction is easily exaggerated, it should not be lost. Some mergers 
                                                                                                                            
expansion reducing the defendant's share to less than 40 percent. The 
court's only discussion of proof burdens concluded that while the district 
court had discretion to place the burden of proving easy entry on the 
defendant after the plaintiff showed sufficiently high concentration, the 
court was not obliged to shift the burden when easy entry seemed obvious. 
Id. at 664 n.6. 
 
4 See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶701d 
(3d ed. 2008) (acquisition of potential rival as Sherman §2 violation). 
 
5 See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 
(1964). 
 
6 See 4 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶907 
(2d ed. 2004), which cites §2 cases. 
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with potential rivals might be thought not to “ lessen” competition at 
all because they neither reduce the number of rivals in the market 
nor increase the market share of any firm.7 But when the dominant 
firm in the market has a market share satisfying the Sherman Act §2 
standards for monopoly or attempt, a “ lessening” of competition is 
not essential to illegality. Such a merger tends to maintain a 
monopoly by cutting off an avenue of future competition before it has 
had a chance to develop.  As a result, condemnation under §2 is 
appropriate. 
Possible efficiencies defense8 
In order for a dominant firm to defend its acquisition of a nascent 
rival on the basis of claimed efficiencies, it would have to show 
provable efficiencies that could not be brought about by means other 
than the merger (i.e., “merger-specific” efficiencies), and that do not 
result from the creation of a monopoly.9 But provable merger-specific 
efficiencies from the acquisition of a nascent firm should be quite 
unusual; in most circumstances the dominant firm could readily 
duplicate anything that the nascent firm has to offer. 
The exceptions are (1) when the nascent firm has a new 
technology protected by the intellectual property laws that the 
dominant firm can acquire only by acquiring the firm itself; or (2) 
when the nascent firm has a substantial position in a different market 
and the efficiencies either result in that market or else from the 
combination of ownership controlling the two markets. 
Regarding the first, suppose that the dominant firm uses a 
process that costs $6 per unit but that a tiny rival who has not yet 
made its first sale in the market develops and patents equally good 
technology costing only $4 per unit. Not being able to license the 
technology, the dominant firm launches a hostile takeover of the tiny 
                                                 
7 This is particularly true of the “actual potential entrant” doctrine. See 5 
Antitrust Law ¶1121 (2d ed. 2004). 
 
8 On the efficiencies defense generally, see 4 & 4A Antitrust Law, Ch. 
9E. 
 
9 Cf. the 1997 revised statement on efficiencies to the 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, §4.0: “[c]ognizable efficiencies are merger-specific 
efficiencies that … do not arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or 
service.” These Guidelines are reprinted as Appendix A in the Annual 
Supplement. 
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firm itself. We would treat this as little different in principle from a 
patent monopolist's acquisition of an exclusive right in a competing 
patent at the center of its power,10 and thus as presumptively 
unlawful.11 To be sure, the acquisition permits the dominant firm to 
reduce its production costs, but it does so by eliminating competition 
between the production alternatives. The most likely reason that this 
market has a chance of becoming competitive is that the nascent 
firm has a technology that will enable it to compete successfully with 
the dominant firm; and nothing prevents the dominant firm from (1) 
attempting to acquire a nonexclusive license from the nascent firm;12 
or (2) if that effort fails, to develop its own alternative technology. 
Regarding the second situation noted above, suppose that a firm 
is nascent in the dominant firm's market but has a significant position 
elsewhere, and combining the two firms produces certain 
efficiencies. For example, in the El Paso Natural Gas case13 the 
acquiring firm had significant gas fields in Texas, while Pacific 
Northwest, the acquired firm, had fields in the northern United States 
and Canada. Although Pacific Northwest had made bids to southern 
California purchasers, it had not yet won any bids and thus was not 
an actual seller there. In such a case the union of the firms could 
produce significant offsetting efficiencies in the other market.14 Of 
course, this raises the problem of the extent to which efficiencies in 
one market justify anticompetitive results in a different market.15 
IP Acquisitions: 
                                                 
10 See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶707a, 
b (2d ed. 2008). 
 
11 As 3 Antitrust Law ¶707d notes, however, an acquisition of a 
nonexclusive right would be legal. 
 
12 See the discussion infra. 
 
13 See El Paso Natural Gas, 376 U.S. at 651. 
 
14 This might occur, for example, if El Paso had substantial facilities in 
the northern United States as well, and joint operation of the firms' facilities 
would have reduced costs there. These were not the facts of the actual 
case. 
 
15 See 4A Antitrust Law ¶972. 
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Nonexclusive license or compulsory licensing as solution16 
The discussion of patent acquisitions by monopolists shows that 
concerns about anticompetitive effects from the dominant firm's 
acquisition of technology are satisfied by requiring that the dominant 
firm obtain only a nonexclusive license.17 The problem is not 
materially different when the dominant firm seeks to acquire the tiny 
firm itself rather than its patents or other intellectual property. First, 
while technology acquisitions can certainly promote efficiencies, a 
nonexclusive right does so just as well as an exclusive one.  Second, 
if the main concern is that the acquisition threatens to eliminate a 
rival technology, that threat is taken care of by the nonexclusive 
license or else by the acquirer's willingness to license all others 
without royalty—that is, to place the acquired technology in the 
public domain. To be sure, this may often mean that the acquisition 
is not worth nearly as much to the acquiring firm, but if the principal 
value of the acquisition is the dominant firm's maintenance of its 
technological hegemony, then the only alternative is outright 
condemnation.18 
Market Delineation in Unilateral Effects Cases 
The merger to monopoly and the dominant firm's acquisition of a 
small or nascent rival both offer measurable injury to competition in 
the conventional sense of creating or preserving a highly 
concentrated, presumably anticompetitive market structure. The 
remaining “unilateral effects” cases seem different in that the 
aggregate market shares of the merging firms represent a 
nondominant position in the relevant market as it existed before the 
merger occurred. Further, the merger does not necessarily facilitate 
coordinated interaction (collusion or oligopoly) with other firms, as 
explained in Subchapter 9B-2. For example, one may see situations 
where a market has ten firms, A, B, C, … J. Firms B and C then 
                                                 
16 The same issue arises when the underlying concern is that a large 
firm's acquisition of a smaller rival's technology might facilitate collusion by 
forestalling new competition. See 4 Antitrust Law ¶927d3. 
 
17 See 3 Antitrust Law ¶707g (3d ed.). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Baroid Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 2610-01 
(1994) (consent decree conditioning acquisition by large firm of competing 
technology on the granting of licenses to others); United States v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 Fed. Reg. 8839-02 (1989) (similar). 
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merge and are able to exact a “significant” price increase for their 
product notwithstanding the fact that their aggregate share of the 
premerger market was small, often less than 20 percent. The 
following observations are relevant: 
A. The primary concern of merger policy is mergers that 
facilitate the exercise of market power, which is the ability 
to profit by raising price above one's cost. While market 
share is a surrogate for market power and widely used in 
antitrust cases, it is by no means a perfect surrogate.19 
B. Clayton Act §7 acquires the appraisal of a merger in some 
“line of commerce” and some “section of the country.” 
Although this language does not explicitly require a market 
definition in a merger case, the courts have generally 
required a market definition. 
C. The economics literature on unilateral effects—and the 
expert economist conducting empirical tests—often 
dispenses with a conventional market definition in such 
cases, preferring to measure market power directly by 
estimating the change in residual demand facing the post-
merger firm. “Residual demand” refers to the demand for a 
firm's goods after the output of all other competing firms 
has been taken into account. As a firm's elasticity of 
residual demand decreases, its power to profit by a price 
above its cost increases.20 This methodology is quite 
sensible for the economist, whatever its legal limitations 
may be.21 
D. Literally, the theory of unilateral effects is consistent with 
condemnation of mergers even in unconcentrated 
markets.  The theory is that by eliminating competition with 
a “close” rival in a product differentiated market the post-
merger firm can profitably raise its price, even though the 
                                                 
19 See 2B Antitrust Law ¶¶515, 531 (3d ed.). 
 
20 For a brief, nontechnical overview of the methodologies for 
estimating residual demand, see 2B Antitrust Law ¶521 (3d ed.). 
 
21 See Malcolm B. Coate, Unilateral Effects under the Guidelines: 
Models, Merits, and Merger Policy (FTC, working paper, Oct. 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263474. 
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balance of the market, containing more remote rivals, 
remains relatively unconcentrated.  As the Government 
writes in its Commentary on the Merger Guidelines: 
Indeed, market concentration may be unimportant 
under a unilateral effects theory of competitive harm. As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2’s discussion of 
Unilateral Effects, the question in a unilateral effects 
analysis is whether the merged firm likely would exercise 
market power absent any coordinated response from rival 
market incumbents. The concentration of the remainder of 
the market often has little impact on the answer to that 
question.22 
E. One alternative that we do not recommend is a return to 
Brown Shoe's language of “submarkets”—for example, 
one might say that while the relevant market in the 
hypothetical market of firms A, B, C … J consists of the 
sales of these ten firms, a relevant submarket exists for 
the sales of merging firms B and C. Historically, the term “ 
submarket” has been used to identify artificially narrow 
groupings of sales on the basis of noneconomic criteria 
having little to do with the ability to raise price above 
cost.23 After the merger occurs, post-merger firm BC can 
raise its price significantly above cost, thus meeting the 
usual criteria for market definition and not requiring the 
confusing “submarket” label. A somewhat better but by no 
means perfect usage is to say that the merger facilitates 
the appearance of a new, narrower grouping of sales, or “ 
market,” in which firm BC occupies a sufficiently strong 
position so as to enable its price increase. In fact, the 
merger does not create such a market because a cartel of 
firms B and C would also have been able to increase price 
profitably, indicating that B and C were already a relevant 
                                                 
22 Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, 




23 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). On 
misuse of the term “submarket,” see 2B Antitrust Law ¶533 (3d ed.). 
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market prior to the merger.24 However, before their union B 
and C felt one another's competition as well as that of 
other firms more significantly than after the merger. 
In the Staples case the court concluded that office 
superstores” constituted a relevant submarket within a 
larger market for office supply stores.25 The court cited 
many indicia, such as recognition by vendors and 
distinctive formats, which in fact say very little about 
market boundaries. But most importantly, it noted that 
superstore pricing was disciplined much more closely by 
the pricing of other superstores than by that of office 
supply stores generally. In that case, office superstores 
were a relevant market, and the submarket label adds 
nothing but confusion. 
But to say that a merger of two “superstore” chain 
would lead to a high price is in principle no different from 
saying that, while office supply product sellers generally 
might constitute a relevant market, there is also a smaller 
relevant market consisting of the superstores themselves, 
or at least of some more specialized group of large stores.  
The fact that the superstores charged higher prices in 
communities where they did not compete with each other 
than in communities where they did establishes this.  It is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that if this higher price is 
higher by an unacceptable amount and of an unacceptable 
duration, then the sellers who are able to charge it 
constitute a relevant market unto themselves.  In this 
sense “unilateral effects” analysis is very little different 
from conventional merger analysis. 
In any event, these concerns stated by the Oracle court seem 
well taken: 
Properly construed, Brown Shoe suggests 
merely that the technical definition of a relevant 
                                                 
24 When a group of firms, if united by a cartel, could profitably exact a 
supracompetitive price increase of sufficient magnitude, that group is a 
relevant antitrust market. See ¶530a. 
 
25 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1075 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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market in an antitrust case may be smaller than 
a layperson would normally consider to be a 
market. The use of the term “ submarket” may be 
useful in “ overcom[ing] the first blush or initial 
gut reaction” to a relatively narrowly defined 
market.26 
Focusing on “submarkets” may be 
misleading, however, because “the same proof 
which establishes the existence of a relevant 
product market also shows (or * * * fails to show) 
the existence of a product submarket: … 
Defining a narrow “submarket” tends to require a 
relatively long laundry list of factors, which 
creates the danger of narrowing the market by 
factors that have little economic basis. Courts 
and commentators suggest that the use of the 
submarkets doctrine has, in fact, misled courts 
into “identify[ing] artificially narrow groupings of 
sales on the basis of noneconomic criteria 
having little to do with the ability to raise price 
above cost.”27 
The similarities between the submarkets doctrine 
generally and localized competition in unilateral effects 
cases are difficult to miss. Indeed, commentators have 
been quick to note the potential for “localized competition” 
analysis to devolve into an unstructured submarket-type 
analysis. …28 
                                                 
26United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 
2004), citing FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (D.D.C. 1997), 
which had defined the relevant market as “the sale of consumable office 
supplies through office supply superstores.” 
 
27Oracle, 331 F.Supp.2d at 1119, citing and quoting H.J. Inc. v. 
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1540 (8th Cir. 1989), and 
¶914a in the previous edition as well as Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 33 F.3d 
194, 208 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1066 (1994); Satellite 
Television & Associated Resources v. Continental Cablevision of Va., Inc., 
714 F.2d 351, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984). 
 
28Oracle, id., Citing 4 Antitrust Law ¶914a in the previous edition, as 
well as Roscoe B. Starek III & Stephen Stockum, What Makes Mergers 
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… Merely demonstrating that the merging parties' 
products are differentiated is not sufficient. Instead, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate product differentiation sufficient 
to sustain a small but significant and non-transitory price 
increase. 
Even if a narrow market definition would be appropriate, 
it may be more difficult to identify “clear breaks in the chain 
of substitutes” sufficient to justify bright-line market 
boundaries in differentiated products unilateral effects 
cases. The conventional ideal market boundary divides 
products within the market, which are freely substitutable 
with one another, from products outside the market, which 
are poor substitutes for the products within the market. … 
In differentiated products unilateral effects cases, a 
“spectrum” of product differences, inside and outside the 
market boundary, is more likely. … In discussing unilateral 
effects, Shapiro has written: 
[A]ny attempt to make a sharp distinction 
between products “in” and “ out” of the 
market can be misleading if there is no clear 
break in the chain of substitutes: if products “ 
in” the market are but distant substitutes for 
the merging products, their significance may 
be overstated by inclusion to the full extent 
that their market share would suggest; and if 
products “ out” of the market have significant 
cross-elasticity with the merging products, 
their competitive significance may well be 
understated by their exclusion.29 
                                                                                                                            
Anticompetitive?: “ Unilateral Effects” Analysis Under the 1992 Merger 
Guidelines, 63 Antitrust L.J. 801, 814-815 (1995) (arguing that the 
Guidelines' focus on localized competition should not “ be used as a tool for 
rehabilitating discredited ‘submarket’ analysis”). 
 
29 Quoting and citing Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated 
Products, 10 Antitrust 23, 28 (Spring 1996); United States v. Rockford 
Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1260 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 898 F.2d 
1278 (7th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920 (1990); Super Premium Ice 
Cream Distribution Antitrust Litig., 691 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd 
sub nom. Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 
895 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (table); and Edward Chamberlin, Product 
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Additionally, to the extent that clear breaks are 
difficult to identify, attempts to create defensible 
market boundaries are likely to be based on 
relatively vague product characteristics. Product 
characteristics that are too vague do not meet 
section 7's requirement that the relevant market be 
“well-defined.”30 
In Whole Foods the D.C. Circuit “reluctantly” reversed 
the district court’s refusal to issue a preliminary injunction 
against a contemplated merger between two natural food 
store chains in an alleged relevant product market of 
premium natural and organic supermarkets (PNOS).31  As 
the court described the procedural facts, the defendants had 
been rushing in order to comply with a financing timetable 
for the acquisition, and the FTC had therefore sought its 
preliminary injunction on “at best, poorly explained 
evidence.”32 
The court first of all rejected the FTC’s argument 
that minimized the importance of defining a relevant 
market in a unilateral effects case.  In this case, market 
definition was central, but a price increase depended on 
the existence of a set of “core customers” who would 
prefer to pay higher prices rather than substitute to more 
general grocery chains.  The smaller grouping of sales 
                                                                                                                            
Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 Am. Econ. Rev.(Papers & Procs.) 85, 
86-87 (1950). 
 
30 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1119-1121 
(N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 
31 FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548F.3d 1028(D.C. Cir.  2008). 
See also United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (disagreeing with the district court that lack of voting control of 
one merger partner by another precluded illegality); United States v. Daily 
Gazette Co., 567 F.l Supp. 2d 859 (S.D.W.Va. 2008) (fact that two 
newspapers had already been operating under an approved joint operating 
agreement did not serve to make their complete merger; under JOA many 
portions of the newspapers’ business had continued to compete). 
 
32 Id. at 1032. 
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accounted for by premium natural and organic 
supermarkets (“PNOS”) chains could be a relevant market 
even though numerous marginal customers would switch 
to more general grocers in response to a small but 
significant price increase: 
The FTC's evidence delineated a PNOS 
submarket catering to a core group of customers 
who “have decided that natural and organic is 
important, lifestyle of health and ecological 
sustainability is important.”33 It was undisputed that 
Whole Foods and Wild Oats provide higher levels of 
customer service than conventional supermarkets, 
a “unique environment,” and a particular focus on 
the “core values” these customers espoused.  The 
FTC connected these intangible properties with 
concrete aspects of the PNOS model, such as a 
much larger selection of natural and organic 
products, FTC's Proposed Findings of Fact 13-14 & 
¶ 66 (noting Earth Fare, a PNOS, carries “more 
than 45,000 natural and organic SKUs”) and a 
much greater concentration of perishables than 
conventional supermarkets, id. 14-15 & ¶ 69-70 
(“Over 60% of Wild Oats' revenues” and “[n]early 
70% of Whole Foods sales are natural or organic 
perishables.”)….34 
 
 The court concluded that the district court erred in assuming 
that market definition “must depend on marginal consumers….”35  The 
FTC had contended that the merging partners, Whole Foods and Wild 
Oats, were the two largest operators in the market for premium, 
natural, and organic supermarkets, which were stores that focused on 
high quality and particularly natural foods, targeting well educated and 
generally affluent customers.  The FTC further alleged that under this 
market definition the merger would create monopolies in 18 cities 
where the two firms each had a store prior to the acquisition but had no 
rivals.  The defendant, by contrast, claimed that the market must be 
                                                 
33 Citing Whole Foods, 502 F.Supp.2d at 23. 
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defined more broadly to include other grocery chains who had and 
were continuing to expand rapidly into the natural foods business. 
 
 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that it lacked 
jurisdiction because the case was moot, given that the merger was 
already completed and a certain amount of reorganization, including 
the sale of numerous stores, had already occurred.  It noted numerous 
decisions holding that a remedy would be appropriate even after an 
acquisition had occurred.  Further, the Supreme Court had proclaimed 
that divestiture is an appropriate remedy in a merger case – something 
that would be relevant only subsequent to a challenged acquisition.36  
In this case, where the merger had already occurred once the district 
court had declined to issue a preliminary injunction, the FTC would not 
be entitled to divestiture, but the court could preserve the existing 
status quo, perhaps by a hold separate order, or even restore the 
status quo ex ante.37 
 
 Further, the district court had applied the correct legal standard 
for a request for a preliminary injunction by a government agency.  The 
FTC did not need to show irreparable harm, and “private equities” 
alone could not override its showing of probable success on the 
merits.38  Rather, the district court “must balance the likelihood of the 
FTC’s success against the equities, and the FTC could generally 
create a presumption favoring such relief by “rais[ing] questions going 
to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult[,] and doubtful as to make 
them fair ground for thorough investigation….”39  The merging parties 
could rebut this presumption only by demonstrating “particularly strong 
equities” favoring the merging parties.  In this case the district court 
had declined to balance any equities, a conclusion that must have 
                                                 
36 Id. at 1033.  Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 & n. 
8 (1972); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105 (D.C.Cir. 
2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 US 952 (2001), on remand 231 F. Supp. 
2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 373 F. 3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
 
37 Ibid..  The court additionally found as a factual matter that one of the 
reorganization or divestiture that had actually occurred would likely, if 
reversed, be tremendously upsetting to the firms.  Id. at 874. 
 
38 Id. at 1035. 
 
39 Ibid.,  quoting Heinz, 246 F.3d at 726. 
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rested on its conclusion that the FTC had failed to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits.40 
 
 In addition, the district court had 
 
observed that several supermarkets “have already 
repositioned themselves to compete vigorously with Whole 
Foods and Wild Oats for the consumers' premium natural and 
organic food business.” Thus, considering the defendants' 
evidence as well as the FTC's, as it was obligated to do, the 
court was in no doubt that this merger would not substantially 
lessen competition, because it found the evidence proved 
Whole Foods and Wild Oats compete among supermarkets 
generally. If, and only if, the district court's certainty was 
justified, it was appropriate for the court not to balance the 
likelihood of the FTC's success against the equities.41 
 
 But the circuit court disagreed with the district court on this 
issue.  In this case the plaintiff’s expert had predicted a post-merger 
price increase on the basis of estimates of demand elasticity that did 
not require market delineation in the traditional sense.  However, the 
Supreme Court had interpreted the “any line of commerce” language 
in Section 7 of the Clayton Act to require a market definition.42  The 
court somewhat ambiguously suggested that market definition would 
not always be “crucial to the FTC’s likelihood of success on the 
merits.  Further, the analytical structure of defining a relevant market 
“does not exhaust the possible ways to prove a Section 7 violation 
on the merits.”43  Nevertheless, a fair reading of the court’s statement 
is that it was insisting on a market definition before a merger could 
be condemned in a proceeding on the merits, even if other types of 
evidence indicated the likelihood of a post-merger price increase. 
 
 In this case, however, the issue seemed irrelevant because 
the FTC had consistently proceeded on the assumption that a 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Id. at 1036. 
42 Id. at 1037-1041. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
324 (1962). 
 
43 Id. at 1037. 
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market definition was necessary.44  So the FTC’s likelihood of 
success depended on the plausibility of its market definition, and this 
in turn depended on the extent to which customers would substitute 
away from the products sold by the two merging firms in response to 
a “small but significant and non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP).  
Here, the defendant’s expert had concluded that if the post-merger 
firm attempted to raise prices, “marginal” consumers – those whose 
loyalties to the natural food chains were relatively weak – would shift 
to more conventional supermarkets in significant numbers.  Applying 
“critical loss analysis” the expert concluded that these substitutions 
would be sufficient to make such a price increase unprofitable.45  In 
contrast, the FTC’s expert rejected critical loss analysis and 
advocated a study of “diversion” ratios which considered “how many 
customers would be diverted to Whole Foods and how many to 
conventional supermarkets if a nearby Wild Oats closed.”  One 
important difference between these approaches was that the 
defendant’s expert looked at the marginal loss of sales, while the 
plaintiff’s expert looked at the average loss of customers.46  Under 
the plaintiff’s theory this use of averages was appropriate because 
there was a core of more committed, or inframarginal, customers 
who would remain loyal to the post-merger firm even in response to 
a significant price increase.47  Thus the question whether a price 
increase would occur rested on a comparison of the losses that 
would result from the loss of marginal customers against the gains 
that would result from higher prices charged to the inframarginal 
customers. 
 
 The court noted that in at least some circumstances the ability 
to price discriminate would enable the firm to charge higher prices to 
inframarginal customers while yet competing for the business of 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
 
45 Id. at 1038. 
 
46 Id. at 1038-1039. 
 
47 The FTC identified these as a “core group” of customers had had 
“decided that natural and organic is important, lifestyle of health and 
ecological sustainability is important.”  See the district court opinion, Whole 
Foods, 502 F.Supp.2d at 223. 
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marginal customers.48  However, it is difficult to see how a retail 
grocer could price discriminate between marginal and inframarginal 
customers, who typically would not even reveal their identities to the 
seller.  Nevertheless, even in the absence of price discrimination 
possibility it might be the case that gains from the higher prices 
charged to inframarginal customers would more than offset losses 
resulting from the departure of marginal customers.  That would be 
an empirical question.  As the court observed: 
 
In short, a core group of particularly dedicated, “distinct 
customers,” paying “distinct prices,” may constitute a 
recognizable submarket, Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325, 
whether they are dedicated because they need a complete 
“cluster of products,” Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 356, 
because their particular circumstances dictate that a product 
“is the only realistic choice,” SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 
660 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.1981), or because they find a 
particular product “uniquely attractive,” Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 112 
(1984). For example, the existence of core customers 
dedicated to office supply superstores, with their “unique 
combination of size, selection, depth [,] and breadth of 
inventory,” was an important factor distinguishing that 
submarket. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.Supp. 1066, 1078-79 
(D.D.C.1997).49 
 
 While the court used “submarket” terminology, it should be 
clear that a relevant market is what it was talking about; that is, the 
relevant concern was that a significant group of customers existed 
who would rather pay a higher price than substitute to alternatives, 
all of which they found less satisfactory for one reason or another. 
 
 The court also cited the FTC’s: 
 
evidence of consumer behavior support[ing] the conclusion 
that PNOS serve a core consumer base. Whole Foods's 
internal projections, based on market experience, suggested 
                                                 
48 Id. at 1040. United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 
1284 (7th Cir.1990); Md. People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 786-87 
(D.C.Cir .1985). 
49 Whole Foods, 548F.3d at 1039. 
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that if a Wild Oats near a Whole Foods were to close, the 
majority (in some cases nearly all) of its customers would 
switch to the Whole Foods rather than to conventional 
supermarkets. Since Whole Foods's prices for perishables are 
higher than those of conventional supermarkets, such 
customers must not find shopping at the latter 
interchangeable with PNOS shopping. They are the core 
customers. Moreover, .68% of Whole Foods customers are 
core customers who share the Whole Foods “core values.”50 
 
 A dissenter complained that the majority was dealing far too 
leniently with the FTC’s definition of the relevant product market.51  
Among other things, the dissenter noted that the merger had already 
been consummated but prices had not increased, thus giving support 
to the claim that the natural food stores competed with larger general 
grocery chains: 
 
In sum, while all supermarket retailers, including Whole 
Foods, attempt to differentiate themselves in some way in 
order to attract customers, they nevertheless compete, and 
compete vigorously, with each other. The evidence before the 
Court demonstrates that conventional or more traditional 
supermarkets today compete for the customers who shop at 
Whole Foods and Wild Oats, particularly the large number of 
cross-shopping customers-or customers at the margin-with a 
growing interest in natural and organic foods. Post-merger, all 
of these competing alternatives will remain.52 
 Rather than showing a distinct market, the dissenter 
urged, the evidence showed no more than product 
differentiation, something which all grocers attempted to 
attain.53  The dissent criticized the both the FTC and the 
majority for falling back on the term “submarkets” and 
falling back to the merger analysis of an earlier era.54 
                                                 
50 Id. at 1039. 
 
51 Id. at 1051 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 1055. 
 
53 Ibid., citing 2B Antitrust Law ¶563 (previous edition). 
 
54 Id. at 1058, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 
 Mergers and Market Dominance 19 
 
Conclusion 
In cases where a merger facilitates a significant “ unilateral” price 
increase for a grouping of sales that was not an obvious relevant 
market prior to the merger, the appropriate conclusion is that the 
merger has identified a new grouping of sales capable of being 
classified as a relevant market. This formulation meets the statutory 
requirement that the “effect” of a merger is anticompetitive in some “ 
line of commerce” and in some “ section of the country.” That is, §7's 
“effect” usage invites consideration of the market's structure after the 
merger rather than before, and if a new grouping of sales can be 
said to constitute a relevant market after the merger, that is an 
appropriate grouping for measuring the merger's competitive impact. 
                                                                                                                            
(1962) as well as 4 Antitrust Law ¶913a. 
